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EUROPE AND THE “RE-REGULATION OF WORLD 












The idea that a reformed and progressive European Union could take the lead 
in the “re-regulation of world society” is raised by Jürgen Habermas in the 
conclusion to an essay on “The Postnational Constellation”, written in the late 
1990s (Habermas, 2001: 111). This vision of the European Union as a 
progressive alternative to rampant neo-liberalism is shared in various forms 
by other left-leaning social and political theorists such as Ulrich Beck (2006), 
Roberto Unger (2005) and Hauke Brunkhorst (2005). It reflects a shift in the 
locus of power from the nation-state to largely unaccountable global 
processes, seeing the EU as a vehicle for redressing this democratic deficit. 
Left eurosceptics would be quick to point out the EU’s own democratic deficit 
and the technocratic nature of its administration, but few would now argue 
that withdrawal is a feasible option. In which case, how should the Left 
respond to the evolution of the European Union in the light of its recent 
spectacular failings, first in being unable to speak with one voice against the 
invasion of Iraq, and second, in being forced to abort the projected 
Constitution following its democratic rejection in France and the Netherlands? 
In what follows I want to contribute to the debate about the Left in Europe by 
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critically examining Habermas’s normative vision. First, however, it is 
necessary to review the development of euro-socialist positions in recent 
years, suggesting a shift from envisaging the EU as a vehicle for strategies no 
longer feasible at the level of the nation state to an EU with the potential to 
develop as a ‘social’ alternative to global neo-liberalism. Habermas’s views on 
the possibility of a progressive European identity are then examined, as they 
clarify the options available to the Left and pose some of the big questions 
which need to be answered before we can push on to what Unger has termed 
“the reinvention of social democracy” (Unger, 2005; 83-97). Finally, and in 
opposition to Habermas, I will argue that a European public sphere will not 
develop as an extension or expansion of civic solidarity allegedly found in 
nation states, but as something new and unique which transcends the 
destructive limitations of nationalist and statist world views. 
 
 
The Old Alternatives 
 
From its inception socialism always expressed its ultimate goals in 
internationalist terms, and, indeed, in most European countries the first great 
International (1864-1872) preceded the emergence of state-centred political 
parties everywhere except Germany and Austria (Braunthal, 1967: 116-117). 
However, the exigencies of operating within the various national arenas led to 
the development of a predominantly national focus, and participation in 
constitutional politics entailed a tacit acceptance of the primacy of nationalist 
sentiment assiduously promoted by the ruling classes in the process of 
establishing their hegemony. The support given to the national governments 
by the socialist parties at the outbreak of the First World War in 1914 struck a 
mortal blow to The Second International. It is worth recalling the lament of 
the historian of the International, Julius Braunthal: 
It had been conceived as a brotherhood, uniting the workers of all 
countries in a spirit of solidarity for the joint struggle against the ruling 
classes. Now the Socialist parties of the belligerent countries were 
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making common cause with their own ruling classes, which bore the 
sole responsibility for the war, against peoples of other lands who had 
had war forced upon them. The bond of brotherhood between nations 
had been broken and the spirit of international solidarity of the working 
classes superseded by a spirit of national solidarity between the 
proletariat and the ruling classes (Braunthal, 1967: 355) 
The long-term results were also disastrous, for it precipitated the sundering of 
the socialist movement across the world. On the one hand emerged a 
communism which disavowed democracy and built its internationalism on the 
theoretical nonsense of ‘socialism in one country,’ and on the other a 
moderate social democracy with very weak international linkages which 
pursued its various forms of social-democracy in one-country. Examples of 
the latter could be seen in the Labour Party programme of 1973, the Wage 
Earner Funds policy of the Swedish Social-Democrats, and the swiftly aborted 
1981 attempt to  ‘break with capitalism’ by the French Socialist government. 
Whatever the internal reasons behind the collapse of these radical 
endeavours, it became clear that the constraints imposed by the need to 
maintain competitiveness in an increasingly open world economy rendered 
conventional ‘left-Keynesian’ strategies obsolete.   
 The Finance Minister of that French Government was Jacques Delors, 
and his response was to attempt to reignite the social-democratic endeavour 
at the level of the European Union (or EEC as it was then). Delors became 
President of the European Commission in 1985 and initiated the idea of the 
single European market, which was vital to the interests of European capital. 
He wanted to match economic integration with political integration and the 
Maastricht Treaty of 1992 was seen by friend and foe alike as a step towards 
a federal Europe. Delors gave a vision of a Social Europe sufficiently 
convincing to convert many left eurosceptics, evidenced by the enthusiastic 
reception of his speech to the British TUC in 1988. The general idea was that 
what was no longer available at the level of the medium-size nation state 
could become a reality at the level of the EU. In order to achieve this in the 
medium-term Delors had to demonstrate the ability of the EU to intervene 
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directly in economic recovery, and in so doing to take on the mantle of an 
interventionist state. This was embodied in the Delors White Paper of 1993, 
“Growth, Competitiveness, Employment”, in which substantial investment in 
three areas - Transport and Energy, Information Highways, and the 
Environment – was to be paid for largely by loans and bonds (The Economist, 
December 11-17, 1993: 27-28). The target was 15 million new jobs by 2000, 
announced at a time when there were alarming predictions that 
unemployment would exceed 20 per cent in countries like Spain and Ireland 
by the millennium. But the most important principle was the creation of an EU 
public borrowing facility hitherto available only to nation states, opening the 
way for a new level of Keynesian interventionism. In this way there would be 
an interventionist counter to the de-regulatory logic of the single market. 
 Delors’ regeneration strategy was moderate in both scale and scope, 
but in principle it opened the way for more radical interventions of the sort 
that had failed in social-democratic led states. The Left saw the possibility 
that this process could be extended into a Social Europe presenting an 
alternative development model for the world economy (Wilde, 1993: 179-
186). Essentially it was hoped that the ‘left Keynesian’ approach, no longer 
feasible at national level, could be reproduced at the internationally more 
powerful level of the EU. This retained a fundamental similarity with 
conventional ‘statist’ forms of socialism in that it aimed at winning state 
power – with the EU as a new state form – in order to implement an 
interventionist grand plan. The complexity of decision-making processes in 
the EU meant that support for a Social Europe would have to be forthcoming 
from a majority of state governments and a majority in the European 
Parliament, but since the departure of Delors in 1995 there has been an 
absence of political will to push forward with such an agenda. The possibility 
that the EU could operate a de facto Public Sector Borrowing Requirement 
was effectively ended at the European Council in December 1994, Delors’ final 
meeting as President.1 Since then there has been no wavering from the 
original principle of the EU of the Balanced Budget Rule, and there is no 
immediate prospect of such a change.2 The imperatives of achieving 
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monetary union and expanding the EU to include the central and eastern 
European states has thwarted the federalist and interventionist ambitions of 
the eurosocialists. In all members states, direct involvement of the state in 
the running of the economy has diminished and the private sector has 
infiltrated the realm of the old decommodified public services. Nevertheless, 
the EU retains a far greater commitment to social welfare than the US, and 
political economists have identified the material basis for the development of 
a European ‘social’ alternative to US-led global neo-liberalism (Pontusson, 
2005; Alesina and Glaeser, 2005). Theorists have now begun to re-think the 
possibility that the EU could become the vehicle for a re-awakening of social 
democracy, not through direct state intervention in economic development 
but through insistence on minimum standards of provision in order to 
eradicate poverty and social exclusion and to ensure environmental 
sustainability. The next section will focus on the contribution to the debate 
over the last decade from Jürgen Habermas, perhaps the most prominent 
advocate of a solidaristic EU capable of leading a re-regulatory governance of 
the world as a whole. 
 
 
Habermas and Postnational Solidarity 
 
Habermas recognises that the EU is dominated by a bureaucratic mode of 
administration. Insofar as functionalist and path-dependency arguments 
explain the success of the EU as a rational way of managing economic life in 
the region, they also show how ‘elite intergovernmentalism’ is perpetuated at 
the cost of neglecting to develop the active support for the ideal of European 
unity, or, in Habermas’s words, the need for the ‘normative integration of 
citizens’ (Habermas, 2006b: 68). The recent debacle over the European 
Constitution is a good example of this, with virtually no attempt made to 
popularise the project or mobilise support for it, and, for that matter, scant 
attention paid to the social guarantees that might have made it attractive to 
ordinary citizens (O’Neill, 2007).  Habermas wants the EU to play the role of a 
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re-regulatory alternative to neo-liberalism, but he does not think this possible 
until a European public sphere, with a collective identity, is created. He 
framed this problem for the first time in a 1990 appendix to Between Facts 
and Norms (Habermas, 1996: 506-7) and developed the discussion in The 
Postnational Constellation (Habermas, 2001: 58-112). More recently he has 
made further observations in two collections of essays, Time of Transitions 
(2006a) and The Divided West (2006b). 
Habermas describes four positions on Europe – the Eurosceptic, the 
Market European, the Federalist and the Cosmopolitan. The Eurosceptic 
approach seeks to regain national autonomy against the grain of economic 
globalisation, while the Market Europeans want the benefits of the single 
market without a central political body to regulate it. The Federalists want a 
stronger European state with far greater harmonisation of policy, and the 
cosmopolitans want to use that example of postnational state-building to 
prefigure similar cooperative institution-building at a global level (Habermas, 
2001: 89). Excited by the prospect of cosmopolitanism, Habermas recognises 
that it will be a stalled project until such time as the goal of a federation is 
realised. He sets two preconditions for the emergence of a federal Europe 
capable of contributing to the creation of a more democratic and egalitarian 
world order. First, that the EU would be able to compensate for the lost 
competencies of the nation state, and second, that within it there could 
develop a collective identity strong enough to legitimate a postnational 
democracy (Habermas, 2001: 90).  
On the question of competencies Habermas appears confident that the 
EU could overcome the institutional barriers to a viable federation, although 
he emphasises that a second chamber of a Euro federation representing the 
governments of nation states would have to be stronger than the directly 
elected parliament (Habermas, 2001: 99). The strength of the state tradition 
in Europe is such that they would have to ‘retain a substantially stronger 
status than would normally be enjoyed by the constituent parts of a federal 
state’ (Habermas, 2006a: 109).  However, he recognises that, despite the 
developing powers of the European Court of Justice and the European Central 
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Bank, for the most parts states have retained their competences (Habermas, 
2006a: 97). In Weberian terms, The EU does not have a monopoly on the 
legitimate use of force, but it does assert the primacy of EU law over the law 
of its member states (Habermas, 2006b: 137).  At various points in his recent 
writings Habermas talks in favourable terms of the prospects of the EU being 
able to levy taxes (2006a: 101), of harmonising tax policy and social policy 
(2006b: 55), of being represented by a foreign minister, (Habermas, 2006b: 
51), and even by a Finance Minister (2006a: 96). For the present, Habermas 
considers the EU to be a ‘lamentable condition’, propelled by bureaucratic 
decision-making processes and suffering from a serious democratic deficit 
(Habermas, 2006a: 76-78 and 2006b: 82). In terms of the four ‘positions’ on 
Europe outlined above, he characterises the situation as a tacit coalition 
between Market Europeans and erstwhile Eurosceptics, the latter being 
prepared to accept the fait accompli of the single market and the euro rather 
than embrace federalism (Habermas, 2006a: 85). This applies equally to Left 
Eurosceptics. 
The failure of the constitutional project reflects a failure to develop 
popular support for the European project, and this brings us to the second 
precondition for a cosmopolitan Europe, a European identity. Habermas 
considers that such a project requires popular support and a sense of 
solidarity, so that forms of civic solidarity previously limited to the nation-state 
would have to be expanded to the European level (Habermas, 2001: 99). He 
accepts that we cannot, at present, speak of the existence of a European 
identity, but the real question ought to be whether we can realistically 
conceive of the conditions whereby citizens are able to extend their civic 
solidarity beyond national borders ‘with the goal of achieving mutual inclusion’ 
(2006b: 76). At this point we should note Habermas’s use of the words 
‘expansion’ and extension’ (Habermas, 2001: 99; 2006b: 77 and 78), because 
he clearly wants to delineate a trajectory from a solidarity-building civic 
consciousness at the national level to some sort of equivalent at the European 
level. In order to do this he makes a conceptual distinction between national 
consciousness and civic solidarity.  
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National consciousness develops when the idea of the nation becomes 
the principal source of collective identity, but civic solidarity develops only in a 
democracy in which people recognise themselves as free and equal citizens. 
The former involves a fixation on the state and its superiority over others, 
while the latter emphasises the liberal order within the state that enables a 
structure of ‘solidarity among strangers’ and thereby opens the way to a 
transnational extension of solidarity. Civic solidarity’s focus on our liberties 
and democratic processes displays a universalistic content beyond national 
boundaries, and this gradual ‘uncoupling’ of the constitution from the state is 
what Habermas terms ‘constitutional patriotism’ (Habermas, 2006b: 78-79). 
Like all liberal nationalists, Habermas needs to make a clear distinction 
between good and bad nationalism. He acknowledges the ‘Janus face’ of 
nationalism, but insists that it reflects not simply blind fealty to the state but 
also awareness of the value of political rights and civil liberties (Habermas, 
2001: 101-102). I find this argument problematic and will return to it below, 
but for now let us look at the distinction he makes between civic solidarity 
and global solidarity (Habermas, 2001: 110; 2006b: 80) 
When considering the possibility of cosmopolitan solidarity, Habermas 
concludes that that the idea ‘has to support itself on the moral universalism of 
human rights alone’, rather than being rooted in particular collective identities 
(Habermas, 2001: 108). Moral outrage over violations of human rights 
provides a sufficient basis for solidarity among activists engaged in global 
politics, but this is a ‘weakly integrated’ cosmopolitan society. What is lacking 
at the global level, according to Habermas, is a ‘common ethical-political 
dimension’ to sustain a collective identity. Within nation-states, he argues, 
there is a common political culture in which the various actors engaged in 
negotiations operate within ‘common value orientations and shared 
conceptions of justice’ which enable agreements to be made beyond the limits 
of instrumental rationality. In other words citizens can agree to make some 
sacrifice of their narrowly-defined self-interest in order to strengthen society, 
as, for example, when assenting to economic redistribution through 
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progressive taxation. However, at the international level this ‘thick 
communicative embeddedness’ is missing (Habermas, 2001: 108-109). 
The question then is raised as to whether the European Union can 
offer some sort of mediation between the state level and global level by 
developing a transnational extension of civic solidarity (Habermas, 2006b: 
67). Solidarity within the EU would require something more than the strong 
negative duties displayed by global activists. It would require a widespread 
sense of belonging if Europe were to speak with one voice in foreign affairs 
and execute an active domestic policy (Habermas, 2006b: 80). However, 
whereas this sense of belonging at national level drew on notions of a shared 
national history and therefore appeared to be somehow ‘natural’, at the 
European level such an allegiance would have to rely on an explicitly 
constructed collective identity. Habermas considers the shared experiences 
that may be mobilised to foster such an identity. His outline of these building 
blocks for European identity appears in an essay entitled “February 15 or: 
What Binds Europeans”, which refers to the massive demonstrations against 
the impending invasion of Iraq in numerous European cities in 2003. He 
invokes seven experiences (Habermas, 2006b: 46-48): 
1. The secularisation of the state, or the privatisation of faith. 
2. Following long periods of class conflict, the emergence of a 
confidence in the state to compensate for market failures. 
3. Growing awareness of the paradoxes of progress, so that we are 
able to assess with care what might be lost in the process of 
modernisation and what might be gained. 
4. Against the background of both the traditions of the labour 
movement and Christian social thought, a ‘solidary’ ethos of struggle 
for greater social justice. 
5. As a result of the destructive history of the twentieth century, 
sensitivity has emerged for violations of personal and bodily integrity, 
reflected in the fact that the death penalty is outlawed in Europe. 
6. In view of the history of wars between European states, a 
commitment to reciprocal restriction of the scope of sovereignty. 
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7. In view of the loss of empire, the experience of decline can lead to 
Europeans achieving ‘a reflexive distance towards themselves,’ learning 
to see themselves from the perspective of the defeated. 
If this is to be something more than a wish list from a strong supporter of a 
federal social Europe, some consideration of the extent to which these 
collective experiences are really ‘in development’ is required. 
 Let us first consider these experiences in as positive a light as possible. 
The achievement of the secularisation of the public sphere is something that 
is shared and valued highly by citizens of states in which religion had 
previously played an intrusive role, such as Ireland, Italy and Spain. It also 
implies rejecting calls to invoke the specifically Christian heritage of Europe, 
for only by reminding ourselves of the catastrophic damage of past religious 
wars and pogroms can we hope to achieve cultural reconciliation and 
embrace the future membership of Turkey. It requires a decisive ‘no’ to the 
pleas of Giscard D’Estaing, Chair of the Constitutional Review, to exclude 
Turkey on ‘cultural’ grounds (Evans-Pritchard, 2002), or to Pope Benedict 
XVI’s call to give primacy to Christianity in the consolidation of European 
identity (Traynor, 2007b). However, this is not the same as lending support to 
the sort of militant anti-religious sentiments expressed by Dawkins in The God 
Delusion (Dawkins, 2006), since that would also cut the ground from 
attempts to develop social solidarity. Habermas rightly comments, in a 
dialogue with Cardinal Ratzinger (now Pope Benedict XVI), that those 
committed to a secular polity should nevertheless respect the verities raised 
in religious thought, and recognise the religious roots of much of our 
normative language  (Habermas and Ratzinger, 2006: 51 and 44-45).  
The second point appeals to a priority of state over markets, and 
although this has been particularly strong in the Scandinavian states it is 
weaker elsewhere. However, even in those states where marketisation has 
been most advanced (e.g. Britain and Ireland), there persists a strong feeling 
that the social cost of the pursuit of high growth is intolerable, and, unlike 
American communitarians (Etzioni, 1998), that the state must play a lead role 
in ensuring social cohesion. The third point concerning the paradoxes of 
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progress may appear to be primarily a concern for intellectual elites, but in 
fact it does reflect a more widespread healthy scepticism to elite 
pronouncements on issues on which there is alleged to be ‘no alternative’, 
such as genetically modified foods, nuclear power, or raised pension ages. 
‘What are we living for?’ is a well-established question in European 
philosophy. The fourth point, relating to the struggle for social justice, reflects 
a common European historical experience, often expressed through the 
language of solidarity with an ethical commitment drawing on both secular 
and religious traditions (Stjernø, 2004, part two; Baldwin, 1990). Of course 
the formulation of this as a common experience conveniently overlooks the 
bitterness of the class struggles that have always been present in capitalist 
Europe, but it could be argued that the establishment of the principle of the 
welfare state as a ‘peace formula’ between warring parties (Offe, 1984: 147ff) 
is still robust. The fifth experience, a developed sensitivity to brutality, is more 
difficult to assess, and the horrors that accompanied the disintegration of 
Yugoslavia give pause for thought. Nevertheless, the contrast with the 
American experience is clear, not just in terms of capital punishment but also 
in much lower levels of violent crime and imprisonment in Europe.  
The remaining two points appear more pertinent to continental Europe 
rather than Britain, and indeed Habermas not only concedes ‘English’ 
reticence towards the European project but considers that this uneasy 
relationship should not be ‘brushed under the carpet’ (2006b: 53). Certainly 
the disastrous experience of three major wars between France and Germany 
was the major background factor in the renunciation of the old enmity and 
the establishment of a new form of institutionalised reciprocity which 
effectively transcended the Westphalian system of sovereign states which 
aver to no superior authority. The remarks on Britain reflect Habermas’s 
anger at the British government’s support for the invasion of Iraq, for this 
decision (with the support of the Spanish conservative government) 
completely undermined the possibility of the EU speaking with an 
authoritative, restraining voice. Nevertheless, the bloody failure of the 
misadventure surely means that it will take its place alongside Suez as a 
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milestone in the self-understanding of the limitations of British state power. 
Further, it will encourage a critical look at the perils of a servile relationship 
with the United States and should, by extension, encourage a closer affiliation 
to Europe.  
The final point is about learning the lessons of national decline and the 
development of a new form of self-understanding which allows for 
reconciliation. The nations of Europe have had to deal with such issues as the 
collaboration of swathes of their people with dictatorial regimes or occupying 
powers. Habermas has dwelt on the German experience of coming to grips 
with its Nazi past (Habermas, 2006a: 38-50), but in recent years there has 
been an accumulation of critical histories and documentaries bringing to light 
shameful episodes from the histories of numerous European states. These 
experiences should contribute to a popular understanding of history which 
rejects the puerile adulation of nation and instead promotes a strong human 
rights culture. The recent call by German Justice Minister Brigitte Zypnes for 
Holocaust Denial and the display of Nazi symbols to be criminalised 
throughout Europe is an example of how this new European self-
understanding might develop (Traynor, 2007a). 
What social forces might impel us towards a politics of re-regulation? 
Habermas is clear that the impetus for the idea of the re-regulation of world 
society has been supplied by citizens and citizens’ movements rather than 
governments or political parties (Habermas, 2001: 111). This reflects the 
dramatic retreat of the Left in Europe in recent years, with a loss of belief in 
the capability of political parties to challenge the dictates of the market. As 
Unger puts it, there has been a wholesale surrender to the ‘the dictatorship of 
no alternatives’ (Unger, 2007: 1-11). Habermas recognises that at some stage 
political parties will need to take decisive action to move beyond the mere 
management of the status quo, but this can happen only when global issues 
become part of the domestic political agendas (Habermas, 2006b: 81-82). In 
this respect the British case is interesting, for not only were global issues 
marginal in the political debates of 2005 General Election campaign, but 
Europe itself was not a major issue because the rival parties saw no 
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advantage in making it into one. Immediately following the election, however, 
the news was dominated by global politics issues – the Make Poverty History 
Campaign and the Gleneagles Agreement, the terrorist attacks on London, 
and the alarm bells over global warming. It is difficult to imagine another 
General Election campaign that will not demand a debate on these global 
issues, but although Habermas is right to see this as a necessary condition for 
the revival of ideological commitment in party politics, it is not the only 
condition. In the British case, the absence of proportional representation 
ensures the petrifaction of a party system in which the parties stand for 
nothing other than their own aggrandisement.  Only new political formations 
can break this pattern, and only proportional representation can enable those 
formations to emerge – this is a central issue in the renewal of political 
democracy and the renewal of the Left.  
Habermas’s theoretical focus on communicative action leads him to 
search for the processes of consensus formation required for a European 
political civic identity. He recognises that this cannot be controlled from above 
or produced by administrative decisions (Habermas, 2006b: 82), but he 
maintains a faith that a European identity will develop as a ‘learning process’ 
(Habermas, 2006a: 105). The problem with this pursuit of an ever-elusive 
consensus is that it deflects attention from the real antagonisms within 
Europe that exacerbate social divisions. The struggle for re-regulation is a 
struggle against powerful interests, and popular acceptance of the EU as a 
progressive political entity will occur only when concrete goals of social justice 
are fulfilled. Nevertheless, Habermas is right to emphasise that discourse and 
communication are powerful forces for the development of a new form of 
collective identity. Although common value orientations are lacking at the 
international level, the processes of global negotiations produce what he 
identifies as ‘normative framing’ (Habermas, 2001: 109-110). The process of 
normative framing flows from the reality of a global discourse on a range of 
issues. So, for example, international non-governmental organisations can 
help to shape the agendas of United Nations summits by bringing key issues 
to the attention of citizens across the world, and by using institutionally 
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established forms of lobbying. This in turn helps to produce agreements on 
concrete targets and action plans to achieve them. In this way apparently 
weak forms of legitimation ‘appear in another light’ as this ability of citizens to 
shape agendas is taken into account. He suggests that the ‘opening up’ of 
national agendas might develop into a ‘self-propelling process’ of shared will- 





Habermas raises the possibility that Europe could evolve into a political entity 
that bridges the gap between the idea of civic solidarity embedded in national 
communities and the purely moral appeal to cosmopolitan solidarity operating 
at the global level, but he offers no clear indication of how this might emerge. 
The chief problem is the persistence of nationalism, as Habermas himself 
admits when commenting that ‘the divisive force of divergent national 
histories and historical experiences that traverse European territory like 
geological fault lines remains potent’ (Habermas, 2006b: 81). For a European 
identity to emerge, these allegiances must become ‘historical’ in the sense 
that they can no longer be called upon to place an emotional veto on the 
emergence of a wider solidarity. It seems to me that Habermas is setting an 
impossible task in seeking to ‘expand’ civic solidarity to the European sphere, 
because that form of solidarity is bound up with national consciousness too 
closely to permit the conceptual distinction that is so important to him.  
By his own admission, ‘civic solidarity’ at the national level is ‘relatively 
thin’ (Habermas, 2006b: 55). It is paid for ‘in small change’, in the sense that 
citizens pay their taxes but are no longer prepared to die for their country, 
and he rightly observes that neither the US nor Britain could sustain the war 
in Iraq if they had to rely on conscription (Habermas, 2006b: 77). But if civic 
solidarity is so ‘thin’, then how can Habermas impute a ‘thick communicative 
embeddedness’ to the ‘common political culture’ that is supposed to exist at 
the level of the nation state? (Habermas, 2001: 109). And if a strong civic 
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solidarity means willingness to die for one’s country, are we not better off 
without it and ill-advised to want to ‘extend’ it to the European polity? 
Habermas’s conceptual distinction between national consciousness and civic 
solidarity simply does not work. Insofar as we can talk of solidarity in civil 
society it is normally not orientated to the state at all. The ‘good citizen’ may 
be socially active through involvement in trades unions, charitable work, 
community action, or in any number of causes, but this does not involve a 
conscious rallying around the constitutional achievements of the liberal 
democratic state. Indeed it is often the most politically astute citizens who are 
most critical of the democratic deficits of those liberal democratic states, such 
as unfair voting systems, unelected second chambers, patronage, etc. 
Respect for democratic processes is necessary for the development of a public 
sphere, but it is not sufficient to constitute solidarity. There have been, of 
course, examples of national solidarity, as expressed in wartime, but this is 
generated by national consciousness, a consciousness which, is, more often 
than not, supremacist and irrational, and, as Michael Billig has argued, is 
constantly reiterated in the everyday discourse of ‘banal nationalism’ (Billig, 
1995). A recent example of the hopelessness of allegedly progressive 
politicians trying to harness national sentiment was provided by Ségolène 
Royal, the Socialist candidate for the 2007 French Presidential election, when 
she called on all citizens to display the tricolour on national holidays. 
Doubtless she would claim to be encouraging civic solidarity, but the fascist 
Le Pen was surely right to conclude that ‘by stealing my ideas, my rivals are 
in fact validating them’ (The Guardian, March 27, 2007).  
Habermas’s claim that we can gradually uncouple the constitution from 
the state to achieve ‘constitutional patriotism’ is misguided, and we should not 
be looking for something positive to be made from patriotism of any sort. If 
civic solidarity in distinction from national consciousness is an illusion, as I 
suggest, then support for a European project has to be grounded in 
something new, not ‘extended’ or ‘expanded’ from in any way, shape, or 
form. In this sense Ulrich Beck has made a valuable contribution to the 
debate on the potential of the European Union in Cosmopolitan Vision (Beck, 
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2006: 163-177). Here he provides an outline of what he terms a 
‘cosmopolitan Europe’ that celebrates the achievement of the EU in promoting 
reconciliation between nations and for enabling states to understand that 
their power is increased by renouncing national sovereignty. He offers four 
theses in support of this vision. The first of these is that the European Union 
does not replicate the national illusion of cherishing common descent and 
culture by marginalising or excluding outsiders (Beck, 2006, 164-166). He 
extols the value of a ‘radical openness’ which involves people of all traditions 
in making the cosmopolitan European project work, and in terms of the 
boundaries of Europe this means making every endeavour to include Turkey. 
His second thesis is that cosmopolitan Europe is leaving behind not just the 
nationalism associated with modernity but also the relativism associated with 
postmodernism. The old Europe may have been associated with colonialism, 
jingoism and genocide, but it also generated the evaluative standards with 
which to judge them and move forward (Beck, 2006: 170). In a real sense 
the idea of European unity grew out of the resistance to the horrors of the 
world wars and the nationalism which propelled them (Beck, 2006: 168).  
The third thesis decries thinking about Europe in national terms which 
obstruct the development of a ‘Europe of diversity’ (Beck, 2006: 171-172). 
The standard models for the European Union – a federal superstate or an 
intergovernmental confederation – both preserve the national mentality, 
requiring either a new European nation or defending the priority of existing 
nation-states. In practice the evolution of Europe has already surpassed this 
either/or and replaced it with a both/and in which, claims Beck, ‘national legal 
and political cultures continue to exist and are simultaneously merged into a 
European legal culture’ (Beck, 2006: 172). The key conclusion here is that 
Europe will never be possible as a project of national homogeneity. Self-
determination is still a goal, but a self-determination liberated from ‘national 
solipsism’, expressing the liberties of diverse groups and orientations and 
opening out to the world. His final thesis is that cosmopolitan realism is not a 
utopia but a reality in which the cooperative fusion of the nation-states has 
not disempowered them but instead generated a ‘political surplus value’ which 
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can serve as an inspiration for the development of cosmopolitanism on a 
wider scale. The European cosmopolitan project cannot be likened to the 
United States multicultural model in which a new nation was created to 
overcome national differences amongst its immigrant population. Rather the 
new Europe has to embrace deep-rooted identities and ancient enmities in a 
process of reconciliation in which the principles of national, cultural and 
religious toleration are institutionally ‘anchored, preserved and guaranteed’ 
(Beck, 2006: 176). The pragmatic nature of Beck’s intervention emphasises 
the unfolding nature of a new socio-political identity which grows with the 
Europeanisation and cosmopolitanisation of everyday life and needs no flags 
or anthems. Beck concedes that the current state of the European Union 
merits criticism, but he rightly sees no progress in grounding that criticism in 
a nationalist standpoint. However, he is not a political theorist as such and 
pays no specific attention to the real problems surrounding the democratic 
deficit, the constitutional impasse, and the stuttering of the ‘social Europe’ 
project. The question remains as to how socialist principles of equality and 
self-realisation can be advanced in the framework of the EU.  
  
 
Implications for the Left 
 
The Left in Europe is disparate, and it has always been easier to say what it 
stands against rather than what it stands for. What it stands against are those 
forces that have impelled us along the path of economic globalisation since 
the 1980s, encapsulated in the name of its ideology, neo-liberalism. 
Globalisation as such cannot be ‘sent back’, and it would be futile for the Left 
to envisage a return to national roads to socialism. The task is to create 
within the EU a mode of governance which insists on a range of social 
guarantees to its own citizens (and denizens), delivered in a variety of ways, 
in accordance with the principles of democracy and subsidiarity. This social 
model can then act on the global stage as an alternative to the depredations 
of neo-liberalism, moving in the direction of Habermas’s vision of the re-
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regulation of world society. Neo-liberalism is still the ideology of choice of the 
world economic and administrative elites, and its message is made into reality 
throughout the world via the decisions of the triumvirate of the World Trade 
Organisation, International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank. All barriers 
to trade are swept away, except for the massive subsidies operated in the 
richest states, including the EU. The privatisation of basic services is forced 
upon the Less Developed Countries, exacerbating poverty, disease, and 
helplessness. The extent to which the EU has been complicit in this triumph of 
marketisation should not obscure its potential to challenge neo-liberalism. It is 
already a powerful player on the global stage, but the weakness of Europe as 
a polity has prevented the emergence of the major questions of global 
economic governance from reaching the political agenda. Instead, it has 
taken direct citizen action through the NGOs and the Social Forum movement 
to address the injustices reproduced by the world market. For the EU to 
become an alternative voice in global politics there needs to be a 
reconnection between activists and parties of the Left, focused on priority 
issues such as poverty and social justice. 
Within the framework of the EU we can adopt a dual perspective on 
these crucial issues of poverty and social justice. From Europe, looking 
outward, we see the possibility of moving much further than the Gleneagles 
Agreement of the G8 in 2005, which is already in danger of unravelling, 
according to former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan (Elliott and Connolly, 
2007). What is possible here is to guarantee states the right to maintain 
social control of services vital to bringing people out of poverty, such as free 
water, healthcare, and education. The other perspective is when we look 
inside Europe and see that the same forces of economic globalisation that 
have beggared the poorest countries in the world have created the problems 
of increased poverty, criminalisation and urban degeneration within some of 
the richest countries in the world. These issues can be linked. For example, 
agricultural subsidies in the EU provide an immense obstacle to the economic 
development of the poorest countries in the world, for they effectively close 
off the European market to their food exports. Rapid phasing out of those 
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subsidies could lead to a reconfiguration of the EU budget to boost structural 
and cohesion funds to combat the ‘new poverty’.  
The ‘Make Poverty History’ campaign was brilliantly successful at 
mobilising support to address the stain of poverty in the less-developed 
world, but as a slogan it can also be applied to the states of the EU. In his 
budget speech in March 2007 Gordon Brown proudly announced tax 
measures that would lift 200,000 children out of poverty, helping to meet the 
Labour Government’s aim of reducing child poverty by half by 2010 (The 
Guardian, March 22, 2007). Behind that boast is the dreadful admission that 
after ten years in power of the one of the richest countries in the world a 
Labour Government is unable to provide for the most basic needs of hundreds 
of thousands of children. The recent United Nations study for child well-being 
placed the United Kingdom bottom of a league of 21 countries, with 16.2 per 
cent of children living below the poverty line (The Guardian, February 14, 
2007). The United States was ranked second to bottom. The richest and most 
neo-liberal states treat their children with contempt, and in Britain a 
government apparently of the Left has been in power for a decade. At the top 
of the league were four EU states, the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark and 
Finland. This is the sort of comparison which the Left must be making within 
the European Union, highlighting best practice and demanding concrete 
targets for the elimination of poverty, the provision of high levels of education 
and healthcare for all, and the promotion of sustainable environmental goals. 
If the Left is to use the EU to promote a politics of social justice, it 
follows that Europe needs to be more than a loose confederation of states 
tied together for no other reason than to share the economic-growth benefits 
of a single market. Equally, a ‘Social Europe’ will not be pulled out of a hat 
through Habermas’s fictions of civic solidarity or constitutional patriotism, 
which are based on the illusion that there is something in its postnational 
achievement around which all classes and interests can rally. The welfare 
gains produced in Europe came as a result of protracted class struggle, and a 
Social Europe will emerge only when a coalition of movements succeeds in 
forcing the EU to apply targets of social welfare as rigorously as it applied 
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economic criteria for entry into the single market. This will meet with stern 
resistance from the powerful beneficiaries of neo-liberalism within the EU, but 
Habermas is right to suggest that there is much in Europe’s historical 
experience that progressive forces can draw from. When the question of the 
European Constitution resurfaces, the Left must not permit the lead to be 
taken by patricians of the European Right, but should argue energetically for 
a serious (i.e. accountable) commitment to social justice to be embodied in 
the new agreement. The most appropriate institutional processes to promote 
a politics of re-regulation need not be specified in advance, but the important 
principle to be insisted upon is the democratic involvement of affected citizens 
at the appropriate level of decision-making and policy-implementation. The 
renewal of democracy within the states of the EU as well as the 
democratisation of decision-making in the EU are fundamental prerequisites 
for the emergence of a Social Europe dedicated to the abolition of poverty 
within and without its borders.  
 
 





1 The official document of the Council thanks Delors’ profusely but Annex 3 makes it quite 
clear that the financing of transnational projects will remain within existing financial 
regulations.  
 
2  I am indebted to Rob Ackrill from the Division of Economics in the Business School of 
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